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EMPLOYEES' SUITS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT
By ALBERT B. GERBER t AND S. HARRY GALFAND
The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 1 has been in effect since
October 24, 1938. Nevertheless, during the federal fiscal year 1946
more than half of the establishments subject to the Act were found to
have been violating it.2  Since the Act provides for enforcement by
private suit at the expense of the employer with recovery of additional
amounts as liquidated damages, 3 it was to be expected that a stream
of cases would flow into the courts. The stream became a veritable
flood in recent months when "portal to portal" suits 4 became one of
the main topics of news interest. While the substantive law that
emerged from the earlier decisions has received a fair share of analysis, 5
the procedural aspects of employees' suits under the Act, particularly in
view of the "walking time" actions, merit closer study. It is the pur-
pose of this article to consider primarily such procedural and allied
aspects.
I. INTRODUCTION
Briefly stated, the Act provides that any employer who violates
its minimum wage 6 or overtime provisions 7 shall be liable to the em-
ployees affected for (I) the total amount which was underpaid, (2) an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages, (3) a reasonable at-
torney's fee, and (4) costs of the action." Assuming that a given case
meets all the requirements of the Act for recovery, a host of preliminary
questions will be met and must be resolved before final judgment is
entered.
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I. 52 STAT. io6o (1938), 29 U. S. C., §201 (1940).
2. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour and Pub. Contracts Div. Release, Aug.
2, 1946. The exact percentage given by the Administrator was 521.
3. 52 STAT. o6g, 29 U. S. C., § 216 (1938). •
4. See, e. g., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 26, 1946, p. i, col. i (ioo million
dollar portal-to-portal suit against International Harvester) ; Phila. Legal Intelligencer,
Dec. 24, 1946, p. 1, col. 4 (portal-to-portal suits total 534 million, claims still mounting).
5. See Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945 (1946) 59
HARV. L. REV. 322; Brundage, "Regular Rate" of Pay Under Sectiol 7 (a) of the
FLSA (1946) 34 CArIF. L. REV. 227; Ball, Piece Work Pay Under FLSA (1945) 6
ALA. LAW. 410; Simon, Contemporary Problems Under Federal Wage-Hour Law
(1945) 5o Com. L. J. 75.
6. 52 STAT. i062 (1938), 29 U. S. C., §206 (194o).
7. Id. at 1O63, 29 U. S. C., § 207 (1938).
8. Id. at io6g, 29 U. S. C., §216 (1938).
(5o5)
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II. JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. State or Federal Forum
Where may the action be brought? In the State Court? In the
Federal Court? In either? The Act itself seems to make the matter
clear by stating that an employee's suit "may be maintained in any
court of competent jurisdiction." 9 Notwithstanding this apparently
clear legislative grant of jurisdiction, there was some early controversy
on the subject. 10 The controversy concerning jurisdiction is now solely
a matter of historical and academic interest. Today, an employee's
suit under the Act may be brought in any state' or federal court'12
having original jurisdiction over suits involving general contractual
claims. State courts have jurisdiction over employees' suits because
the Act specifically so provides.' 3 Federal courts have jurisdiction for
the same reason and, moreover, because the Judicial Code gives juris-
diction to the federal courts over "all suits and proceedings arising
under any law regulating interstate commerce." 14
B. Removal
If suit is started in a state court, there may be an attempt by the
defendant to remove it to the federal court under the Federal Removal
Act.15  This Act provides that "Any suit of a civil nature . . . aris-
ing under the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . of
which the district courts of the United States are given original juris-
diction . . . may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district
court of the United States. . . ." Since the "district courts of the
United States are given original jurisdiction" over FLSA suits by
9. 52 STAT. I069, 29 U. S. C., §216 (1938).
IO. Poole, Private Litigation Under the Wage and Hour Act (1942) 14 Miss. L.
J. 157, 158-9; Crockett, Jurisdiction of Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (94) 39 MicH. L. REV. 419.
ii. Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 24o Ala. 277, 198 So. 7o6 (194o) ; Emerson
v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 851 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Hart v. Gregory, 218 N. C. 184, IO S. E. (2d) 644 (194o); Newman, Jr. v. Fuller
Co., iI C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,274 (R. I., 1946) ; Tapp v. Price-Bass Co., 177 Tenn.
189, 147 S. W. (2d) 107 (1941) ; Stringer v. Griffin Grocery Co., 149 S. W. (2d) 158
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
12. Shain v. Armour & Co., 4o F. Supp. 488 (W. D. Ky. 1941); Lengel v. New-
ark Newsdealers Supply Co., 32 F. Supp. 567 (D. N. J. 194o) ; Campbell v. Superior
Decalcomania Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 663 (N. D. Tex. 1940).
13. Brockway v. Long, 55 F. Supp. 79 (W. D. Mo. 1944); Brantley v. Augusta
Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943). See Sloan, Jurisdiction of State
Courts in Actions Under Wage and Hour Law (1941) J. B. Assl. KAN. 354.
14. 36 STAT. 1092 (I91I), 28 U. S. C., § 41 (8). Lengel v. Newark Newsdealers
Supply Co., 32 F. Supp. 567 (D. N. J. i94o) ; Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 46o
(E. D. Pa. 194o). See Reese, Concurrent Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts
Under Section x6 (b) of the FLSA (94) 27 VA. L. REV. 328.
15. 36 STAT. 1094 (igII), 28 U. S. C., §71 (1940).
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virtue of Section 24 of the Judicial Code 16 it would seem that such a
suit is removable. Some courts have so held. 17  This view, declared
by one court to be a "reactionary interpretation," 18 has been rejected
by the bulk of the courts that have considered the question; 19 and one
commentator has pointed out that "to confer removal jurisdiction on
the federal court is to give it in practice exclusive jurisdiction at the
option of the employer." 20
C. Limitations Imposed by Federal Jurisdiction
Most of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in either state
or federal forum will become apparent as each of the succeeding points
is developed. However, mention should be made of the fact that if
the employees desire to sue in a federal court and to join their FLSA
claims with an action on a contract, specific grounds for federal juris-
diction must be found. For example, in Timony v. Todd Shipyards
Corp.21 the plaintiffs, in addition to their claim under the FLSA, sued
for premium pay due under a collective bargaining contract. It was held
that this claim required normal federal jurisdictional allegations 22 in
order to be sustained.
23
III. PARTIES
A. Plaintiff
The Act specifies that any one or more employees may bring the
action on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees simi-
larly situated, or the employees may designate an agent or represen-
i6. 36 STAT. 1094 (9II), 28 U. S. C., §4I (8) (I94O).
17. Koskala v. Butler Bros., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 66,283 (D. Minn. 1946) ; Cox
v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E. D. Ky. 1943), order sustained 142 F. (2d)
876 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944). See Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956,
958 (D. N. J. 194o). See also Ray and Young, The Removal of Employee Suits
Brought Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (1945) 18 TENN. L. REv. 676; Notes
(1942) 36 ILL. L. REV. 787, (1941) 9 KAN. Ci, L. REv. 227.
18. Fredman v. Foley Brothers, 5o F. Supp. 161, 162 (W. D. Mo. 1943); Cofer
v. Hercules Powder Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,276 (E. D. Tenn. 1946); Tobin v.
Hercules Powder Co., 63 F, Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945) ; Steiner v. Pleasantville Con-
structors, Inc., 59 F. Supp. lol (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
1g. Brockway v. Long, 55 F. Supp. 79 (W. D. Mo. 1944) ; Brantley v. Augusta
Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; Garner v. Mengel Co., 5o F. Supp.
794 (W. D. Ky. 1943); Apple v. Shulman Publications, Inc., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
11 61,973 (D. N. J. 1943).
20. Note (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 541, 542.
21. 59 F. SuPP. 779 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 151 F. (2d) 336 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 779 (1946).
22. Kuhn v. Canteen Food Service, 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 11 62,517 (N. D. Ill.
1944), 15o F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945). Accord: Schempf v. Armour & Co., ii
C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,287 (D. Minn. 1946). But see Crabb v. Welden Brothers, 65
F. Supp. 369 (S. D. Iowa, 1946).
23. Contra: Adair v. Ferst, 45 F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Ga. 1942).
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tative to maintain the action.24  Thus, the employee may sue, 25 or his
assignee may bring the action,2 6 or he may designate an agent to pre-
sent his claim. 27  It seems obvious from the language of the Act that
the employees' labor union may maintain the action.28  However, if a
union brings the action the employees should not be individually named
as plaintiffs. If this is done a motion to dismiss as to the union on
the ground that it is a superfluous party plaintiff will be properly
granted.
29
B. Group Actions
Since a large number of employees can join, the suit has been lik-
ened to a "class action" under the Federal Rules. 30  With respect to
terminology the courts are in disagreement as to whether the suit is
a "true class action," '1 a "hybrid action" 32 or a "spurious action." 83
However, regardless of nomenclature and terminology the courts have
reached certain definite conclusions with respect to these group actions,
and, as Judge Goodrich has pointed out in connection with this problem,
"there is divergence in the reasons assigned for the result." 84 At
least the following rules have been established:
Any group of employees may band together and bring an action,
notwithstanding the existence of differences among them "as to time
worked, wages actually due and hours of overtime involved." s5 There
may even be "marked differences" a3 in employment, but as long as
24. 52 STAT. i069,29 U. S. C., § 216 (b) (I94O).
25. If the employee is a minor, suit should be brought by the minor's guardian.
Constance v. Gosnell. 62 F. Supp. 253 (W. D. S. C. 1945). In Baggett v. Henry
Fischer Packing Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 6o,654 (W. D. Ky. 1941) a former em-
ployee brought the action.
26. Steiner v. Pleasantville Constructors, Inc., i8i Misc. 798, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 120
(N. Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd as modified, 782 Misc. 66, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 42 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. i944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 738, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 700 (1st Dept. 1945) ; Grip-
pentrog v. Cheese Makers' Mfg. Co., 245 Wis. 1, 13 N. W. (2d) 391 (i944).
27. Hargrave v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 36 F. Supp. 233 (E. D. Okla.
194i); Greenberg v. Bailey Lumber Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1160,366 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. St. Louis Co. 1941).
28. Building Serv. Employees Internat. Union, Local 238 v. Trenton Trust Co.,
142 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 3d, x944).
29. Cabunac v. National Terminals Corp., 139 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
See also Townsend v. Palmer, 35 F. Supp. 938, 940 (D. Mass. 1940).
30. See Rohl, Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (1942) 37 ILL. L. RE-v. 11g.
31. See Note (1946) 46 COL. L. Ray. 818; 2 MooR,, FmnatU. PRACriCE (1938)
2236.
32. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 4 F. R. D. 350 (W. D. Pa. i945), rev'd, 752 F.
(2d) 85i (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
33. Ibid. See Saxton v. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519, at 521 (N. D. Ga. i94o).
34. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 752 F. (2d) 85i, 856 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
35. Saxton v. Askew, 35 F. Supp. 5i9 (N. D. Ga. 1940). See Jumps v. Leverone,
i5o F. (2d) 876 (C: C. A. 7th, 1945).
36. Distelhorst v. Day & Zimmerman, 58 F. Supp. 334 (S. D. Iowa, 1944), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 15o F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945). But cf. Rockwood v.
Crown Laundry Co., 352 Mo. 561, 178 S. W. (2d) 440 (1944) (where state procedural
rules were held to prohibit joinder of dissimilar causes of action). Accord: Archer
v. Musick, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,234 (Neb. 1946).
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there is a peg upon which to hang the statutory language "employees
similarly situated" the action may go forward.37 After the action has
been begun other employees will be permitted to join through amend-
ment of the complaint.3s However, the defendant will be protected
by a motion to dismiss as against all unnamed employees who do not
join within a reasonable length of time.39 Such a motion should not
be made prematurely or it will be denied.40  Further protection is af-
forded the defendant in that employees who wait until after the Stat-
ute of Limitations has run will not be permitted to join.41 As to each
newly joining employee the action will be deemed commenced as of
the date of joinder.
42
All employees who would recover must join. None who are not
plaintiffs, intervenors, or named and authorizing litigants, may re-
cover.43  One commentator has criticized this rule, arguing that its
"practical effect . . . is to vitiate the class-suit provision of the
FLSA." 4 However, this criticism is of questionable validity since
any number of employees may indicate their assent to the suit and thus
create a class-suit by group action and employees who do not join
are not bound.45  A contrary rule would create a "startling re-
sult," 46 namely that employees who know nothing of the action might
be bound by the judgment therein.
37. Dolan v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1162,189 (D. Mass.
1943) (office employees and shop employees permitted to be joined in one action);
McNorrill v. Gibbs, 45 F. Supp. 363 (E. D. S. C. 1942).
38. Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Fineshewitz
v. East River Savings Bank, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 885 (N. Y. City Ct 1946).
39. Wilson v. F. J. Egner & Sons, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 847 (N. D. Ohio, 1944);
Orton v. Basic Magnesium, Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1f 62,887 (D. Nevada, i945) ;
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 4 F. R. D. 350 .(W. D. Pa. 1945), rezld, 152 F. (2d) 85i
(C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
40. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F. (2d) 85i (C. C. A. 3d, 1945) ; Townsend v.
Palmer, 35 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1940). Where appeals consume a considerable
period of time a new allowance for intervention will be made. Tennessee Coal, Iron
& R. R. Co. v. Muscoda, Local 123, 5 F. R. D. 174 (N. D. Ala. 1946).
41. Robertson v. Alaska Juneau Gold Min. Co., 6i F. Supp. 265 (N. D. Cal. 1945),
rev'd on other grounds, Ixi C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,424 (C. C. A. 9th, 1946).
42. Barb v. Manhattan Laundries, Inc., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,210, I5 N. Y.
L. J. 2207 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946). Contra: Wright v. United States Rubber Co., ii
C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,361 (S. D. Iowa, 1946).
43. Jumps v. Leverone, i5o F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945) ; Timberlake v. Day
& Zimmerman, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 28 (S. D. Iowa, 1943) ; Lewis v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 162,3o6 (S. D. Fla. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, io
C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,070 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946).
44. (1942) 55 HARv. L. Ray. 688.
45. See Pentland v.-Dravo Corp., 152 F. (2d) 851, 853 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
46. Ibid.
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C. Authority to Bring Action
The plaintiff, when suing on behalf of other employees, should
have specific authority to bring the action.47  Failure to disclose the
authority is not necessarily fatal and does not render the complaint
subject to a motion to dismiss, but the defendant may move to compel
the plaintiff to disclose his right to bring the action.4 8  The names of
all employees whose written authorizations the plaintiff fails to pro-
duce will be eliminated.
49
D. Survival of the Action
In the event of the death of an employee prior to institution of the
suit, it would seem that the action survives and an administrator or
executor may sue.5" In several cases this procedure was successfully
employed. 51 Where the employee-plaintiff died after suit was begun
the substitution of the deceased's administrator was permitted, 52 and
where an employee was adjudicated a bankrupt the court indicated
that his claim passed to the trustees and the employee could not later
enforce it."3
E. Defendant
A successful action under the FLSA requires that the defendant
shall be the "employer." 54 If an employer's successor or assignee is
made defendant an additional factor is present, and although the ac-
tion may be maintained, it is no longer solely a suit under the FLSA. 5
However, a mere bookkeeping transfer of the business to create a new
employer will not relieve the apparent employer of liability under the
Act.56
47. Jumps v. Leverone, i5o F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Thomas v. Key-
stone Silver, Inc., 174 Misc. 733, 22 N. Y. S. (2d-) 796 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 194o).
48. Shannon v. Franklin Simon & Co., 18I Misc. 939, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 442 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1943).
49. Paranteau v. Swift & Co, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,289 (D. Minn. 1946).
5o. See Poole, supra note io, at 162.
51. Porter v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 5o F. Supp. 959 (M. D. Ga. 1943);
Southern Package Corp. v. Walton, Admx., i96 Miss. 786, 18 So. (2d) 458 (1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 762 (1944) ; De Luca v. West 26th St. Corp., u C. C. H. Lab.
Cas. 1 63,255 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
52. Fletcher v. Grinnell Bros., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 163,168 (E. D. Mich. 1946).
53. Burns v. Gilpin, i82 Tenn. 535, 188 S. W. (2d) 338 (1945).
54. Bowman v. Pace Co., IIg F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 5th, 194) ; see Fanning v.
Machinery Builders, Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Gas. 62,987, 114 N. Y. L. J. 1745 (N. Y.
City Ct. I945). A managing agent of a building may be the employer and liable as
such. Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave. Corp., io C. C.:H. Lab. Cas. 162,907 (S. D. N Y.
1946), aff'd, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,212 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). For the problem of
employees as associates of a partnership see (942) 56 HARv. L. REv. 478 and Shea
v. Wadsworth, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,326 (E. D. N. Y. 1946).
55. Davis v. Onyx Oils & Resins, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 777 (D. N. 3. 1946);
Townsend v. Palmer, 35 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1940).
56. Ridgeway v. Warren, 6o F. Supp. 363 (M. D. Tenn. 1945).
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Suits against dissolved corporations should be brought promptly
or they will be barred. In two cases where a corporate employer was
dissolved pursuant to statute and under court supervision, employees'
FLSA claims, not filed during dissolution, were rejected by the court.5 7
A similar rule has been applied to bar a claim, not filed promptly as
required by a state probate statute, against a deceased employer. 58
Where there is a question of which of two defendants is the "em-
ployer" it would seem proper to join both.59
IV. THE COMPLAINT
A. Jurisdictional Allegations
Obviously, the normal allegations of the existence of employment,
violation of the Act, etc., must be set forth in the complaint. From the
reported cases it appears that there has been no failure to set forth
these elementary averments. However, one jurisdictional allegation
has caused difficulty-the statement relating to interstate commerce.
Under the Act an employer is liable only if the employee "is en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 60
The complaint must thus set forth facts which, if proved, would demon-
strate that the employee is engaged in interstate commerce or in the
production of goods therefor. Failure to allege such facts renders the
complaint vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. 61 It is insufficient to
allege that the employer is engaged in interstate commerce.62 Finally,
the allegations should not be couched in conclusions but in intermediate
facts from which an appropriate conclusion can be drawn.63
57. Wolf v. Miesch Realty Corp., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 162,581 (S. D. N. Y.
1945) ; Rieck v. Iowa Guarantee, Inc., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. f 61,564, ff 61,624 (S. D.
Iowa, 1943). .
58. Hays v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n., 71 Cal. App. (2d)
3o, 162 P. (2d) 679 (1945), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 979 (1946). See also In re New
Style Hat Mfg. Co., 43 F. Supp. 122 (N. D. Ohio, 1940) where the employee waited
a considerable length of time before filing a claim against an employer in bankruptcy.
The claim was disallowed on a basis of proof but the delay in pressing the claim was
emphasized. However, in Plourde v. Massachusetts Cities Realty Co., 47 F. Supp. 668
(D. Mass. 1942) it was held that a final decree entered in a reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Act discharging the debtor of all debts was inoperative to bar a claim
under the FLSA.
59. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 129 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. ioth,
1942) (joint judgment against both defendant companies authorized); Ferrara v.
Pratt-Smith Produce Corp., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1162,204 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
6o. 52 STAT. io62-3 (1938), 29 U. S. C., §§2o6, 207 (1940).
61. Foster v. National Biscuit Co., 31 F. Supp. 552 (W. D. Wash. 194o); Watt
v. McWilliams Dredging Co., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1162,392, 112 N. Y. L. J. 1130 (N.
Y. City Ct. 1944) ; Oliphant v. Kaser, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,928 (Iowa, 1945).
62. McCarthy v. American Surety Co., x83 Misc. 983, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 6oi (Sup.
Ct. 1944), appeal dismissed, 27o App. Div. 751, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 369 (ist Dept. 1946).
Accord: Baggett v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 37 F. Supp. 67o (W. D. Ky. 1941).
63. Broderick v. Lemkau-Kidd Corp., 267 App. Div. 91, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 505 (Ist
Dept. 1942). Accord: Gustafson v. Fred Wolferman, Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
ff 62,774 (W. D. Mo. I945); Feinman v. Fleischer, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 865 (Sup. Ct.
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B. Specificity of Facts Relating to Overtime and Pay
It is obvious that employees suing under the FLSA are not armed
with facts and figures enabling them to allege in detail the number of
overtime hours worked, the dates on which the work was performed,
and other details normally required of the pleader. However, since
the Act requires the employer to keep such records,64 the courts have
been lenient and have not stricken down complaints for failure to
specify the details of employment,6 5 and have refused to grant defend-
ants' motions for bills of particulars to obtain greater details concerning
the employees' claims.66
One court aptly explains this rule as follows:
"The alleged failure of the plaintiffs to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted is in effect a criticism of the plaintiffs' in-
ability to set out the exact hours and the exact amounts that will
be in controversy. Such a failure cannot be deemed fatal when
consideration is given to the probability that the plaintiffs are with-
out definite and exact knowledge of the hours and wages in con-
troversy, whereas the defendants, undoubtedly, have full and com-
plete records bearing on this matter." 67
In this connection the model complaint prepared by the General
Counsel of the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, contains the
following paragraph:
"Plaintiffs are not informed as to the exact amount of overtime
rendered by each of the employees or the wages still due and owing
for overtime hours worked for which no payment was made, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Such information is
not available to the employees who are represented in this action.
But the records are, or should be, under the provisions of the said
Act, in the exclusive possession of the defendant herein." 68
1944) ; Emanuele v. Rochester Packing Co., Inc., 182 Misc. 348, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 164
(Sup. Ct. 1943) ; cf. Doyle v. Johnson Bros., Inc., 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 603 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1941).
64. 52 STAT. io66 (1938), 29.U. S. C., §211 (c) (1940).
65. Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp.. 6I F. Supp. 996 (S. D. Cal. 1945);
Townsend & Yancey v. Boston & Maine R. R., 3 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 60,200 (D.
Mass. 1940). Accord: Stangler v. Calvert Mfg. Co., 115 N. Y. L. J. 2119 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1946).
66. Dykema v. Aluminum Co. of America, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. f 63,j44 (N. D.
II. 1946); Snyder v. Gurnsey, 43 F. Supp. 204 (D. N. H. 1942); Mitchell v. Brown,
6 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,140 (D. Neb. 1942) ; Potts v. Stedman Co., 5 C. C. H. Lab.
Cas. 61,o21 (Ohio, 1942).
67. Townsend v. Palmer, 35 F. Supp. 938, 940 (D. Mass. I94O).
68. United Steelworkers of America, Instructions in Procedure in Travel Time
Cases, Nov. I, 1946, p. 14.
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However, where the facts relating to employment are known to the
plaintiff such facts should be pleaded in full or the complaint will be
found defective.
69
C. Exemptions
Although the Act contains a series of exemptions,"° the courts
have held that there is no need for the complaint to allege facts negat-
ing the existence of an exemption.71 If an employer intends to defend
on the ground of the existence of an exemption it is an affirmative de-
fense and must be set forth by him as such.72 This is in keeping with
the general rule that no complaint will be dismissed unless the plaintiff
could not recover under any set of facts which could be proved under the
allegations in the complaint.7 3
V. PRELIMINARY MOTIONS OF THE DEFENSE
A. Bill of Particulars
When first served with a complaint under the FLSA the defend-
ant employer's first questions are likely to be: "who is suing, for how
long, and for how much?" Therefore, the first motion of the defense
attorney is frequently a bill of particulars or a motion for a more
definite statement. Occasionally this is granted and the employees are
required to set forth extensive and detailed information; 74 or where
the basis of the claim is unclear the employees will be compelled to
clarify.75 More frequently, however, the courts either rule that since
the information, in the form of payroll records and time cards, "is pe-
culiarly within the knowledge of the defendant" 76 a bill of particulars
69. Renner v. Jackson & Co., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,8o8, 114 N. Y. L. J. 1037
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
70. 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U. S. C., §213 (1940).
71. Warner v. T. E. Collins Trucking Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,152 (W. D.
La. 1946); Wallach v. Merit Paper Corp., 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 531 (Sup. Ct 1945);
Thornberg v. E. T. & W. N. C. Motor Transportation Co., 178 Tenn. 298, 157 S. W.
(2d) 823 (1940). In Anderson v. Material Co-ordinating Agency, Inc., 63 N. Y. S.
(2d) 324 (Sup. Ct. 1946), where plaintiff apparently pleaded absence of exemption, he
was given burden of proving the allegation and could not carry it.
72. Schmidtke v. Conesa, 141 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. ist, 1944) (in federal court
exemption in a special defense under FED. RuLEs CIV. PRoc.), Rule 8 (c).
73. Castaing v. Puefto Rican American Sugar Refinery, 145 F. (2d) 403 (C. C.
A. ist, 1944) ; Mennicucci v. F. & P. Brakelyn Service, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 72o (D. N. 3.
1945).
74. Orton v. Basic Magnesium, Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,887 (D. Nev.
1945).
75. Warner v. T.'E. Collins Trucking Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,152 (W. D.
La. 1946).
76. Cuascut v. Standard Dredging Co., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,42r (D. Puerto
Rico, 1944).
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will be denied 7 7 or the motion is limited so as to require the employee
to set forth only such information as he obviously possesses, such as
the approximate date he entered and left the employment of the de-
fendant. 78 This is a reasonable rule designed to ease the burden on
the employer in his record-checking.
Objections to a bill of particulars must be made promptly or the
employee is regarded as having waived the objections. 9
B. Arbitration
In many cases the employees who make claim for additional com-
pensation under the FLSA are subject to a collective bargaining agree-
ment which provides for arbitration of disputes or controversies relat-
ing to terms and conditions of employment. The employer may desire
to have the FLSA claim adjudicated by an arbitrator rather than by
a jury.
In the federal courts this raises the question of the applicability of
the United States Arbitration Act.8 0 From a reading of the Arbitra-
tion Act itself one would not believe that it was intended to apply to
FLSA suits and would further conclude that a motion to stay court
proceedings pending arbitration should not be granted on the basis
thereof. The Arbitration Act specifically excludes from coverage "con-
tracts of employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or iiterstate
commerce." I" Notwithstanding this provision, and without discussing
it, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the district court in
granting a stay of proceedings pending arbitration.8 2 Subsequently
the Fourth Circuit agreed 83 and the Sixth Circuit disagreed.84 The
question again arose in the Third Circuit and Judge Goodrich attempted
to solve the dilemma and adhere to the.earlier decision, by pointing out
that Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, 5 which provides for a stay pend-
77. Dykema v. Aluminum Co. of America, ix C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,i44 (N. D.
Ill. 1946) ; Dolan v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,z89 (D. Mass.
1943) ; Keyer v. Hope Estates, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 1o04 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Snyder v.
Gurnsey, 43 F. Supp. 204 (D. N. H. 1942).
78. Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp, 61 F. Supp. 996 (S. D. Cal. 1945).
79. Eiring v. White Metal Rolling Stamping Corp., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,700,
II3 N. Y. L. J. 24o3 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1945).
8O. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C., §§ I et seq. (194o). See Cohen and Dayton,
The New Federal. Arbitration Law (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 265.
81. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C., § 1 (940).
82. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943);
(i944) 13 FoRD. L. R v. io9.
83. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944).
84. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 6th, I944).
85. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C., § 3 (940).
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ing arbitration, does not reiterate the earlier limitation of the Act's
effectiveness to particular types of contracts.
86
Other courts have considered the question, and applicability of the
federal and state arbitration acts has been denied.
87
In view of the conflict among the federal courts the eventual solu-
tion will probably require a decision by the Supreme Court. Certain
considerations are pertinent. Arbitration, as normally practiced, with
power in the hands of the arbitrator to render a decision and award
irrespective of rules of law or normal findings of fact,88 cannot apply to
suits under the FLSA without creating a severe departure from the
present trend of decisions under the Act. For example, it is held that
the employee's claim to overtime pay and liquidated damages is a public
right and therefore cannot be settled, released, compromised, or other-
wise terminated except by full compliance with the Act, 89 and the Su-
preme Court has refused to allow union-employer collective bargaining
agreements to deprive employees of their full rights under the Act.90
However, if the normal rules of arbitration are to be applicable to the
arbitrator's decisions under the FLSA the result will be that although
the courts are strictly bound by the provisions of the Act, and all par-
ties except those working under an arbitration agreement are strictly
bound, such employees and employers as come within an appropriate
arbitration agreement are bound only insofar as the arbitrator sees
fit to bind them.
While the Arbitration Act permits vacation or modification of an
award solely on the grounds of fraud, corruption, collusion, bias, mis-
calculation of figures, and the like,91 it is questionable whether the Su-
preme Court will sustain an arbitrator's award contrary to the principles
of law the Court has developed concerning the Act.
In view of the discrepancy between the normal processes of arbi-
tration and the rigid rules governing FLSA claims, if the rule author-
izing stays pending arbitration is to be sustained some judicial control
86. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945) at 32o, cert.
denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 522 (1946).
87. Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp., Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 996 (S. D. Cal. 1945);
Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp. x42 (S. D. N. Y. ig43); see Adams v. Union
Dime Savings Bank, 48 F. Supp. 1O22 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Garrity v. Bagold Corp.,
x8o Misc. i2o, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; McClintock v. Garment Center
Capitol, Inc., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,814, mo N. Y. L. J. 1022 (Sup. Ct. I943) (con-
sidered opinion rejecting doctrine of Third Circuit Court of Appeals and accepting
Bailey v. Karolyna Co., supra).
88. See James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Co., 98 F. (2d)
55 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) at p. 57: "The arbitrators, for reasons deemed sufficient to
them, made the awards as indicated. This court is without power to amend or over-
rule merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the
arbitrators."
89. See infra Section VII B.
go. Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S. 173 (1946).
91. 43 STAT. 885 (925), 9 U. S. C., §§ 11, 12 (940).
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over the arbitrator will be necessary. Perhaps a clue to this is found in
the dictum of Judge Goodrich in the Watkins case 92 to the effect that
the question of time worked under the FLSA "is the kind of problem
which is properly referable to a special master or an arbitrator." The
linking of an arbitrator to a master is significant since a master's find-
ings are findings only "to the extent that the court adopts them," 93 and
the' master's conclusions of law are thoroughly reviewable by the
court.94 The reconciliation of the rules concerning arbitrators and those
with respect to masters may cause some difficulty. However, the ju-
dicial process has not been balked by more difficult dilemmas, and we
shall very'likely soon see a special rule relating to arbitrators of FLSA
claims.
VI. DISCOVERY
A. Pre-trial
In the federal courts the normal methods of pre-trial discovery are
available to the plaintiff. The use of interrogatories under Federal
Rule 33 has been a common procedure.95 Another method utilized has
been the motion, under Rule 34, to permit the plaintiff to inspect the
employer's books and payrolls.9 6 If this involves extensive research
the court may appoint a master to conduct the discovery.97 Occa-
sionally a request for the admission of facts finder Rule 36 98 or a pre-
trial examination under the Rules has been used.99
In a recent case the unusual method of discovery (from the plain-
tiff's viewpoint) of a bill of particulars was used. Since the defendant
filed'an answer dealing with the facts relating to the plaintiff's em-
ployment, the employee-plaintiff was held entitled to demand a com-
plete answer setting forth in full all relevant details of employment.100
92. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F. (2d) 311, 313 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U. S. 777 (1946).
93. FED. Rm.Es Civ. PRoc., Rule 52 (e). The trial court must accept the master's
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. In re Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 138 F. (2d)
753 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 789 (i944).
94. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc., 136 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A.
6th, x943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 798 (I943) ; Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Arrow Dis-
tilleries, Inc., 128 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) ; see 8 CycLortmrA OF FEDERAL
PRocEDuRE ('943) § 3452.
95. Used in Mason v. Refiners Transport & Terminal Corp., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
63,1o6 (N. D. Ohio 1946) ; Jumps v. Leverone, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,172 (N.
D. Ill. i946); Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488 (W. D. Ky. i94I).
96. Swoboda v. Carton Finishers, Inc., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,417 (N. D. Ill.
1946).
97. Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp. 460 (E. D. Pa. i94o).
98. Strasser v. Fascination Candy Co., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,89i (N. D. Ill.
1945).
S9. Teichman v. Williamsburgh Fireproof Products Corp., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
62,o4i (E. D. N. Y. 1944).
xoo. Winslow v. National Electric Products Corp., 5 F. R. D. 126 (W. D. Pa.
1946).
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The usual problem that has arisen under the discovery procedure
has been the attempt of the plaintiff to obtain information concerning
employees other than those named as plaintiffs* or named as em-
ployees on behalf of whom the action has been brought. The courts
have uniformly rejected such endeavors on the part of plaintiffs to gain
information concerning employees other than those who are parties t6
the action.'0 1 The plaintiff has also been limited to inquiries concern-
ing hours worked, compensation .paid and the rate of pay; and dis-
covery with respect to the "type of plaintiffs' employment and the na-
ture of defendant's business activities" 102 which the court felt could
be "more easily established by testimony at the trial . . ." 10 has
been denied. Thus, pre-trial discovery has not been helpful to the plain-
tiff in enabling him to prove facts relating to engagement in interstate
commerce.'
04
In the state courts where discovery procedures are available, they
have been used in much the same fashion as in the federal courts, and
with similar results.'0 5
B. At Trial
The use of the subpoena duces tecum to produce the necessary evi-
dence at the trial has raised an interesting question. May the plaintiff
subpoena the employer's correspondence with the Wage and Hour Ad-
ministration? The courts have denied the use of a subpoena for that
purpose.106 The theory of the denial is that the correspondence is
privileged and to use it for private purposes would interfere with the
federal administration of the FLSA.'
07
VII. DEFENSES
It is apparent that a complete denial of the plaintiff's allegations is
the best defense. However, in many cases this is not possible. There-
ioi. Mason v. Refiners Transport & Terminal Corp., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,883
(N. D. Ohio, 1945); Shain v. Armour &,Co., 40 F. Supp. 488 (W. D. Ky. I94i).
1o2. Mason v. Refiners Transport & Terminal Corp., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,883
(N. D. Ohio, i94s). Accord: Garbrandt v. Strawn, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,884
(N. D. Ohio, 1945).
103. Mason v. Refiners Transport & Terminal Corp., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
ff 62,883, 68,466 (N. D. Ohio, 1945).
Xo4. Scaglione v. Guaranteed Printing Service Co., Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
62,792 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) ; cf. Swoboda v. Carton Finishers, Inc., ii C. C. H. Lab.
Cas. 63,417 (N. D. Ill. 1946).
xo5. See Schlein v. Metzger, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. f1 62,9o5, 114 N. Y. L. J. 592
(Sup. Ct. 1945) (pre-trial examination of employer granted) ; Bernstein 'v. Mercan-
tile Ship Repair Co., Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,8o3, 114 N. Y. L. J. 931 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1945) (motion to inspect books, time records, and payrolls, granted).
io6. Davis v. Salter Mills Co., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,82o (D. Mass. 1943);
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 4 F. R. D. 305 (W. D. Pa. 1945), re7'd on other grounds,
152 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
io7. Shallow v. Markert Mfg. Co., i75 Misc. 613, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 823 (Sup. Ct.
1941). Accord: Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5 F. R. D. 5i (E. D. Pa. 1945) (same rule
applied to Treasury Department information).
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fore of necessity, defendants have invoked a series of defenses, each of
which will be considered separately.
A. Payment 10
8
Payment is not a valid defense unless the answer alleges payment
in full when due in accordance with the Act.109 Payment, after the
FLSA wage was due has been held insufficient compliance with the
Act.110 It follows, therefore, that an'offer at the trial to pay any amount
less than the full claim plus liquidated damages is futile.",
B. Release, Settlement, Accord and Satisfaction
In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil"112 Mr. Justice Reed, for the
Supreme Court, with three justices dissenting, held that the FLSA
created rights in employees, which rights were affected with a public
interest, and that consequently a written release of such rights without
payment for the full amount due thereunder was invalid.
It is now well established that a release, as such, whether in the
form of an accord and satisfaction,113 covenant not to sue, 114 a signed
account stated,115 or general discharge of liability '16 does not consti-
tute a valid defense."1
7
xo8. Payment in full should properly be used as a denial and not as an affirmative
defense. Paul v. Greenwich Say. Bank, 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,393, 112 N. Y. L.
J. 1113 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944). For discussion of general denial see Burke v. Mesta
Machine Co, 5 F. R. D. 134 (W. D. Pa. 1946).
iog. Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 47 N. Y..S. (2d) 328 (Sup. Ct. I944),
rev'd on other grounds, 184 Misc. 192, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 295 (Sup. Ct 945) ; cf. Guess
v. Montague, 6 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,467 (E. D. S. C. 1942).
iio. Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 328 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 184 Misc. 192, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 295 (Sup. Ct 1945); Gould
v. Matan Corp., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,932, 114 N. Y. L. J. 582 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1945), aff'd without opinion, 270 App. Div. 848, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 389 (Sup. Ct 1946).
See also DePasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 151 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
ini. Maddrix v. Dize, 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,116 (D. Md. i944), af'd, 324
U. S. 697 (1945) ; Colan v. Wecksler, 45 F. Supp. 5o8 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) (overtime
compensation paid into court). Overpayment is a valid defense. Farrell v. Simons,
Inc, 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,410 (D. Minn. I944).
112. 324 U. S. 697 (1945).
113. Simmons v. Straight Improvement Co., Inc., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,394(S. D. N. Y. '944).
114. Timberlake v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 28 (S. D. Iowa, 1943).
115. DePasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 151 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
116. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., I5I F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U. S. 777 (1946) ; Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave. Corp., ii C. C. H. Lab.
Cas. 63,212 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) ; Birbalas v. Cuneo Printing Industries, 14o F. (2d)
826 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) ; Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 14o F. (2d) 5o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943);
Fiedler v. Potter, i8o Tenn. 176, 172 S. W. (2d) Ioo7 (i43) ; Lantinberg v. DiDome-
nico, xo C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,691 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1945).
117. In Franz v. 48 West 48th St Realization Corp., 6o N. Y. S. (2d) i6o (N. Y.
City Ct z946) the court rejected the contention that the employees cannot bring action
unless they first repay the sums paid in consideration of the release.
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i. Where Bona Fide Dispute Exists
In the Brooklyn Bank case the question of a release given where
a bona fide dispute existed was not raised. The question did arise,
however, in D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi "18 where an honest dispute
existed as to whether the employees were covered by the Act. Full pay-
ment of overtime compensation due was made and a release in full
was executed. Thereafter an employee sued for liquidated damages.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed, with three
justices dissenting,"z9 held that the release was invalid as a defense.
The theory of the Court is that any variation in the sums payable
"thwarts the public policy" 120 of the Act.
The Court specifically pointed out that "we need [not] . .
consider here the possibility of compromises in other situations
which may arise, such as a dispute over the number of hours worked
or the regular rate of employment." x21
Thus it seems clear that although there may be a dispute, if it
can be resolved by simple arithmetic a release will be disregarded.'
2 2
However, the thorny question that arises is the effect of the release
where the employee and employer are engaged in an honest dispute
over the amount of overtime worked. Several courts have indicated
that in such case the release will be regarded as valid.12 3  If this rule
is hedged in with safeguards against a mere recital of a dispute, it
would seem to be a reasonable solution to the problem. Any other
rule would require a complete trial in every case involving a dispute
of fact.
118. 66 Sup. Ct. 925 (1946).
19. JJ. Frankfurter and Burton dissented. C. J. Stone participated in the hear-
ing and disposition of the case and had joined in the dissent prior to his death. 66
Sup. Ct. 925, 932 (1946).
i2o. Id. at 929.
121. Id. at 928.
122. Watkas v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 3d, Ig45), cert. de-
nied, 327 U. S. 777 (946).
123. David v. Atlantic Co., 69 Ga. App. 643, 26 S. E. (2d) 65o (1943); Withers
v. Herbert McLean Purdy Management Corp., 18i Misc. 724, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 26o
(Sup. Ct. 1944). Accord: Atlantic Co. v. A. Broughton, 146 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A.
5th, 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 883 (1945) ; Birbalas v. Cuneo Printing Industries,
140 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) ; Phelan v. Carstens, Linnekin & Wilson, 187
Misc. 352, 62 N. Y. S. (2d) 214 (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1946). See also Cassese v. Manu-
facturers Trust Co., 182 Misc. 344, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 621 (N. Y. City Ct 1943), where
the defendant was a trustee under the supervision of the court and the settlement was
approved by the court. Held, not a valid defense. If the court approves a settlement
that is extremely unfair to the employee it may raise the question of the power of the
court to bargain away the public interest. That courts may, on occasion, be subject to
such practices, see Easley v. Edgord Realty Corp., 270 App. Div. 184, 59 N. Y. S. (2d)
241 (ist Dept. 1945), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 579 (1946) where, prior to suit, defendant paid
plaintiff $158.22 which purported to be payment in full of liability under Act. Poe v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. ff 62,656 (D. Ariz. 1944) ; Strand v. Garden
Valley Telephone Co., 51 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1943). Contra: Paul v. Greenwich
Say. Bank, 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. ff 62,393, 112 N. Y. L. J. 1113 (N. Y. City Ct. 944);
see Fleming v. Post, 146 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
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2. Settlements Under Judicial Supervision
A possible solution to the problem of settling factual controversies
under the FLSA is to require all settlements, since a public right is
involved, to be judically supervised. A few courts have indicated that
such settlements will be binding. 124 However, other courts have re-
fused to approve private settlements. 125 Court-supervised settlements
must be differentiated from settlements made under the aegis of the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Administration, which are not
a bar.
126
C. Estoppel
Ingenious defense attorneys have developed a series of defenses
that have uniformly been stricken down by the courts. The cry of
"estoppel" has been heard often and lustily but has rarely been accepted.
Thus the employee is not estopped because of a failure to make a de-
mand,127 or because he accepted his pay checks and misrepresented the
hours worked and the employer relied upon the misrepresentation.
28
However, where the plaintiff-employee was in full charge of the pay-
roll and failed to credit himself with proper payments he was held
estopped from claiming additional compensation under the Act.
29
The court pointed out that here the employee is bound to make claim
for overtime to give the employer an opportunity to rectify the situa-
tion and avoid liquidated damages.
D. Custom or Contract
Neither custom nor contract, pleaded by the defendant, will avail as
a defense.' The plea of the existence of a collective bargaining contract
has therefore not received much consideration by the courts. Without
124. Allen v. Fred Harvey Service, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,399 (N. D. Ill.
1946) ;Morol v. Harry Thoens & Co., Inc.. 63 F. Supp. 188 (S. D. N. Y 1945).
Contra: Lower court gave plaintiff judgment for $I582 and $75.oo counsel fee. Ap-
pellate court held release not effective to bar suit, reversed judgment of lower court
and awarded judgment of $4,392.92, costs and an attorney's fee of $35o.oo.
125. Rogan v. Essex County News Co., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 82 (D. N. J. 1946);
Mariano v. Air Express International Agency, Inc., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,6o6 (S.
D. N. Y. 1945).
126. Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 74o F. (2d) 5o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ; Strand v. Gar-
den Valley Telephone Co., 5I F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1943) ; Katz v. Film Metal Box
Corp., 181 Misc. 812, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944).
127. Bloch v. Bell, 63 F. Supp. 863 (W. D. Ky. 7945), aff'd and ret'd on other
grounds, 152 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
128. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 152 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945) ; DePasquale v.
Williams-Bauer Corp., 151 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) ; Lewis v. Nailing, 36 F.
Supp. 187 (W. D. Tenn. 794o) ; Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 47 N. Y. S. (2d)
328 (Sup. Ct. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 784 Misc. 192, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 295 (Sup.
Ct. 1945).
129. Cotten v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 20 Wash. 300, 147 P. (2d) 299 (1944).
13o. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U. S.
59o (1944) ; Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, Inc., 66 Sup. Ct i187 (1946).
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attempting to develop the types of contracts upheld and those stricken
down-a full topic in itself-it may be said that a collective bargaining
contract contrary to the FLSA is no defense to an employees' suit.'$'
Even an agreement entered into pursuant to the recommendation of the
National War Labor Board has been held insufficient as a defense.,8 2
E. Statute of Limitatio s18
Congress, in enacting the FLSA, failed to provide a statute of limi-
tations, and the applicable state statute has therefore been held to
apply.' 84 The primary problem that has arisen under the state stat-
utes of limitations has been the nature of the FLSA claim, and which
of several state statutes of limitation should apply. Most courts have
held that a claim under the FLSA is basically contractual and that
therefore the state statute limiting contract actions governs.188 How-
ever, where there is a specific statute governing liability. created by
statute that legislation has been held to govern. 186
Attempts to urge the applicability of state statutes governing pen-
alties have been almost universally unsuccessful.'8 7 However, despite
the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the liquidated
damages payable under the Act "are compensation, not a penalty or
punishment by the government," 188 it has been held that the action is
divisible, that portion consisting of overtime compensation and reason-
able attorney's fees being contractual, and the liquidated damages con-
stituting a penalty so that a penalty statute of limitations governed. 139
131. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., ISI F. (2d) 3I (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U. S. 777 (1946) ; Dillon v. 247 Corporation, 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. f 61,69o
(S. D. N. Y. 1943); Walsh v. 515 Madison Ave. Corp., 181 Misc. 219, 42 N. Y. S.
(2d) 262 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd (no opinion), 267 App. Div. 756 (ist Dept. 1943),
aff'd (no opinion), 293 N. Y. 826 (1944). See also Mallory v. United Biscuit Co. of
America, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. f 62,769 (Ohio C. P. 1945).
132. Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave. Corp., 'o C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,9o7 (S. D.
N. Y. 1946), off'd, iz C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,212 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
133. For a thorough study of this subject see Note (1945) 45 CL. L. Ray. 444.
134. Reliance Storage & Inspection Co. v. Hubbard, 5o F. Supi. 1O12 (W. D. Va.
1943) ; Klatz v. Ippolito, 40 F. Supp. 422 (S. D. Tex. i94i).
135. Smith v. Continental Oil Co., 59 F. Supp. 91 (E. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Keen v.
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 58 F. Supp. 915 (N. D. Iowa, 1945); Cunningham
v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 52 F. Supp. 654 (W. D. Wash. 1943) ; Reliance Storage
& Inspection Co. v. Hubbard, 5o F. Supp. 1012 (W. D. Va.'1943).
136. Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp., Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 9g6 (S. D. Cal. 1945);
Cannon v. Miller. 22 Wash. (2d) 227, 155 P. (2d) 5oo (1945). Contra: Cunningham
v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 52 F. Supp. 654" (W. D. Wash. 1943).
137. Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944) ; Asselta v.
149 Madison Ave. Corp., 10 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1162,9o7 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, ix
C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,212 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) ; Hargrave v. Mid-Continent Petro-
leum Corp., 36 F. Supp. 233 (E. D. Okla. 1941), aff'd, 129 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942) ; Reliance Storage & Inspection Co. v. Hubbard, 5o F. Supp. 1012 (W. D. Va.
1943).
138. Overnight Motor Transportation Corp. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 (1942).
139. Southern Package Corp. v. Walton Admx., 196 Misc. 786, I8 So. (2d) 458
(I944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 762 (1944) (the attorney's fee was held governed by
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Eleven states have enacted statutes of limitations intended to cut
off FLSA actions. 1 4 0  Some of these statutes have been discriminatory
or unusually harsh and have, consequently, failed to meet the test
of constitutionality. 141  However, this subject will probably soon be-
come academic 142 in view of the likelihood of early enactment of a Fed-
eral Statute of Limitations for FLSA claims. At the last session of
Congress 143 four bills were introduced. One of these,'" introduced
by Representative Gwynne, provided for a two year limitation upon ac-
tions. The time limitation was amended by the Senate to three years. 43
However, the session of Congress ended before agreement could be
reached. The probability is that the next session will pass a limita-
tions act.140  It is to be hoped that the limitations imposed will not
be harshly brief.
1 47
F. Violation of the Act Caused by Employee's Conduct
It is a valid defense to an employee's claim under the FLSA that
the violation of the Act was caused solely by the employee. Thus,
where an employee of his own volition works overtime without the
knowledge of the employer 14 8 or in violation of instructions issued by
the employer 1'9 the employer will not be liable. However, the de-
fense must be bona fide and if the employer is aware of the overtime
the contract statute of limitations). This was also the holding in Culver v. Bell &
Loffland, Inc., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,025 (S. D. Cal. 1943), which was reversed
146 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944).
14o. Note (1945) 45 COL. L. Rl.v. 444, 448.
141. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945),
aff'd, 327 U. S. 757 (1946); E. H. Clarke Lumber Co. v. Kurth, 152 F. (2d) 914 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1945) ; Davis v. Rockton & Rion R. R., 65 F. Supp. 67 (W. D. S. C. 1946) ;
Fullerton v. Lamm, 163 P. (2d) 941 (Ore. 1945), aff'd onr rehearing, 165 P. (2d) 63
(Ore. 1946).
142. Some of the problems will remain. For example, see Phelan v. Carstens,
Linnekin & Wilson, 62 N. Y. S. (2d) 214 (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1946), in which it was held
that payment of overtime due but not liquidated damages constituted an acknowledg-
ment of the debt which caused the statute of limitations to cease running and to begin
anew from time of acknowledgment. See also Hayes v. Cuneo Printing Industries, Inc.,
ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,339 (N. D. Ill. 1946) holding that part payment tolled the
statute of limitations.
143. H. R. 2788; H. R. 3079; Sen. 1013; Sen. 750, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
144. H. R. 2788, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
145. I8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (loose Leaf) 1277 (1946).
146. See Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. I7, 1946, p. 6, col. 2 (Limitation of Em-
ployer's Liability Before Congress).
147. The Department of Labor recommends a three year statute of limitations.
Ibid.
148. Anderson v. Sunbright Lumber Co., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,632 (Tenn.
Ct App. 1943) ; see Pioneer Corp. v. Kinsey, 196 Okla. 89, 162 P. (2d) iooo (945).
149. Ortiz v. San Juan Dock Co., Inc., IO C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,789 (D. Puerto
Rico, 1945), Stein v. Gorden Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 F. Supp. 249 (W. D. Mo. 1942) ;
Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Thomas, I95 Okla. 437, 158 P. (2d) 713 (1945) ; West v.
Cleveland Overall Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 16o,671 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1941).
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he is liable under the Act.150 Indeed, the argument that the employee
was a volunteer, working without compensation, has been rejected as
a defense to a minimum wage suit since the Act created liability so
long as the employee has been "suffered or permitted" to work. 151
Where an employee is responsible for keeping records of overtime
a cause of action will not arise out of the employee's having kept errone-
ous records; 152 but, if the employer conspires with the employee to
keep false records, the employer remains liable. 153 Thus, an employee
may contradict a signed time sheet.'5 4  In reply to the contention that
in these cases the employee should be barred because he is in pari
delicto with the employer, one court'5 5 explained by quoting Lord
Ellenborough:
"This is not a case of par delictum: it is oppression on one side,
and submission on the other: it can never be predicated as par
delictum, when one holds the rod and the other bows to it." 16
G. Mental State
The mental attitude of the employer is clearly irrelevant. Thus
good faith and a lack of intent to violate the Act do not comprise valid
defenses. 15 7  Therefore, payment in accordance with a directive of the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division does not relieve an
employer from liability for liquidated damages."5 " Nor will a collective
bargaining contract written under the mutual mistake of law that the
contract conformed to the Act prevent any employee from recovering
full statutory liability.'5"
i5o. Kappler v. Republic Pictures Corp., 59 F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Iowa 1945),
aff'd, 327 U. S. 757 (1946) ; Quillen v. Shapiro, 5 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 6o,915 (M. D.
Tenn. I94I) ; Steger v. Beard & Stone Electric Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 6o,643 (N.
D. Tex. i94i). See also Prentice-Hall Wage and Hour Service, 10,313.10.
ISI. Rogers v. Schenckel, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 163,431 (W. D. N. Y. 1946).
152. Bergschneider v. Peabody Coal Co., 142 F. (2d) 784 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944);
Mortenson v. Western Light & Telephone Co., 42 F. Supp. 319 (S. D. Iowa, ig4i);
Cotten v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 2o Wash. 300, 147 P. (2d) 299 (i944). Contra:
Travis v. Ray, 41F. Supp. 6 (W. D. Ky. 194I).
153. Gosinski v. Eclipse Glass Co., Inc., 13 Conn. Sup. 285 (Conn. C. P. Ct. i945);
Butler v. Carter, 32 S. E. (2d) 8o8 (Ga. 1945).
154. Wilson Oil Co. v. Hardy, 49 N. Mex. 337, 64 P. (2d) 209 (945).
155. Gosinski v. Eclipse Glass Co., Inc., 13 Conn. Sup. 285 (Conn. C. P. Ct. I945).
I56. Smith v. Cuff, 6 M. & S. I6o, 105 Eng. Reprint 1203 (817).
157. Clarke v. 126 Fifth Ave. Corp., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,oi8, 62,o84 (S.
D. N. Y. 1944) ; Missel v. Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc., i26 F. (2d) 98
(C. C. A. 4th, 1942), aff'd, 316 U. S. 572 (1942) ; Wilson Oil Co. v. Hardy, 49 N. Mex.
337, i64 P. (2d) 209 (1945); cf. Andrus v. Harding, 3 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 11 6oi8o (W.
D. Tenn. 194o).
x58. Seneca Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. ioth, 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 772 (1943).
i59. Yellow Truck & Coach Mfg. Co. v. Edmondson, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,150
(C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
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H. Res Judicata
One complete judicial adjudication will bar a second suit between
the parties under the FLSA.' 60 However, the few cases that have
arisen under this defense have usually involved fact situations in which
the court found an absence of res judicata. For example, it has been
held that a decree, in an injunction suit brought by the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division, in favor of the employer will not
bar a subsequent suit by an employee against that employer.1 61 In
another case,' 62 an employee intervened in a suit by a fellow employee
but never had an opportunity to produce evidence or prove his case; he
was held not barred from bringing an action of his own. These cases
illustrate the application to FLSA suits of the general rule that each per-
son is entitled to his full day in court before being barred forever.' 63
Therefore, employees who are not plaintiffs or intervenors, or who did
not authorize suit in their behalf will not be bound by the judgment in
the action.
6 4
I. Miscellaneous Defenses
A series of other defenses will be briefly presented.
i. The fact that the work for which recovery is sought is per-
formed in a foreign country is a valid defense.'
6 5
2. That the work was upon or in connection with property of
the Federal Government is immaterial.' 66
3. Acceptance of an amount paid pursuant to a judgment bars
further appeals.'
67
i6o. Berrios v. Baetier, 6 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,141 (D. Puerto Rico 1942).
In D. & L. Production Co. v. Cuniff, i8o S. W. (2d) 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) a
prior suit for unpaid wages, not brought under the FLSA was held to bar a subse-
quent suit for overtime under the FLSA.
161. Katz v. Film Metal Box Corp., I81 Misc. 812, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (N. Y.
City Ct 1g44).
162. Burns v. Gilfin, 182 Tenn. 535, 188 S. W. (2d) 338 (1945).
163. See RESTATEmENT, JUDGmENTS (1942) § i, Comment b.
164. Brooks v. Southern Dairies, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 588 (S. D. Fla. 1941). Accord:
Clougherty v. James Vernor Co., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,704 (E. D. Mich. I945) ;
Timberlake v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 28 (S. D. Iowa, 1943); Thomas
-v. Keystone Silver, Inc., 174 Misc. 733, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 796 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) ;
see Keyes v. Hope Estates, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 1004 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). Contra: Cissell
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 37 F. Supp. 913 (W. D. Ky. 1941).
I65. Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,391 (S. D. N. Y.
1946) ; Greenstein v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1162,626, 113
N. Y. L. J. 1520 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., I8I Misc. i36, 45 N. Y.
S. (2d) 262 (Sup. Ct 1943).
z66. Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,391 (S. D. N. Y.
1946) ; Ortiz v. San Juan Dock Co., Inc., Io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,789 (D. Puerto
Rico, 1945).
167. Colquette v. Crossett Lumber Co., 149 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945).
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4. A counterclaim, if all procedural difficulties are resolved, may
be used as a defense.' 68
VIII. TRIAL
A. Burden of Proof
I. Interstate Commerce
As is customary, the plaintiff must carry the burden of proving
the essential facts in an FLSA case.169 Thus, he must prove his
engagement in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce.170 The cautious plaintiff will introduce evidence of the
interstate commerce nature of his work even though everyone, includ-
ing the trial court, appears to assume it. In one case,' 7 ' at least, al-
though the trial court assumed engagement in interstate commerce, the
,appellate court reversed because of absence of facts relating thereto in
the record. If a stipulation is used, it should be complete. Where by
stipulation the parties agreed that 27% of defendant's products went
into interstate commerce the court refused to conclude therefrom that
each plaintiff, in a group action, spent 27% of his activities on behalf
of the employer in interstate commerce.'
7 2
However, despite the apparent tendency of these cases the courts
have not imposed too great a burden of proof with respect to interstate
commerce upon employees in FLSA cases. Thus, where an employee
showed that his work was both in inter- and intra-state commerce it
was held that if, as the employer claimed, during certain of the work-
weeks the employee's work was confined solely to intra-state com-
merce, the burden rested upon the employer to prove such facts since
they would be peculiarly within his knowledge.'
73
i68. Scaglione v. Guarantee Printing Service Co., Inc., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
162,734, 162,792 (S. D. N. Y. 1945). The employee's suit may also arise by way of
counter-claim. Smoke Mt. Ind., Inc. v. Fisher, 224 N. C. 72, 29 S. E. (2d) 128 (i944).
I69. E. g., plaintiff must prove defendant was statutory employer. Parenti v. Kala-
mazoo Stove & Furnace Co, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 63,354 (Conn. C. P. Ct. 1946).
170. Schwarz v. Witwer Grocer Co., 49 F. Supp. ioo3 (N. D. Iowa 1943), aff'd,
r41 F. (2d) 341 (C. C.A. 8th, 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 753 (1944) ; Ullo v. Smith,
62 F. Supp. 757 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Lyons v. A. K. Ferguson Co., 16 So. (2d) 587
(La. App. 1944).
17r. Grippentrog v. Cheese Makers' Mfg. Co., 245 Wis. 1. 13 N. W. (2d) 391
(i944).
x72. Cody v. Dossin's Food Products, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,785 (E. D. Mich.
1945).
173. Guess v. B. L. Montague, i4o F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943). See also
Tucker v. Hitchcock, 42 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. Fla. I942), 56 HA.v. L. Rrv. 14o. But
where employer can show different facts concerning interstate commerce for distinct
periods recovery will be limited to the period in which the employee was engaged in
interstate commerce. Asselta v. I49 Madison Ave. Corp., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
1 62,907 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 11 63,212 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
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The Supreme Court has also lightened the plaintiff's burden with
respect to interstate commerce. In a recent case 114 the court held
that the plaintiff sustained his burden where the record showed that
the employer had reasonable grounds to anticipate that material quan-
tities of production would move in interstate commerce. It was not
essential to trace individual products into the stream of commerce.
Moreover, the percentage of interstate activity proved need not be great.
Four per cent has been held sufficient; 175 and so has seven per
cent.y76 However, proof of a mere incidental interstate activity will
be held de miniMisY'
7
2. Hours Worked and Rate of Pay
The general rule is that the plaintiff must prove the number of
hours worked and the regular rate of pay.17' Thus, the employee can-
not prove an overtime claim based upon quantum meruit-there must
be a "regular rate of pay." 119
With respect to the number of hours worked it is obvious that
the employees cannot prove mathematically precise cases. For a time
this caused severe difficulties where courts followed general common
law rules requiring precise proof. °80 However, the Supreme Court in
the Walking Time case 181 set up certain guideposts that will be help-
ful in all cases. The Court pointed out realistically that imposing a
strict standard of proof on the employees would have the "practical
effect of impairing many of the benefits" 182 of the Act and would
be contrary to the "remedial nature of this statute and the great pub-
lic policy which it embodies." s13 The Court considered the difficulties
inherent in proving a case where the only records are inaccurate or
inadequate and stated:
174. D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 66 Sup. Ct. 925 (1946).
I75. Southern Calif. Freight Lines v. McKeown, 148 F. (2d) 89o (C. C. A. 9th,
1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 736 (1946).
176. New Mexico Public Serv. Co. v. Engel, 145 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. ioth,
1944).
177. Porter v. Wilson, 5 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 6o,896 (N. D. Tex. 1942); Morrow
v. Lee Baking Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 6o,7o1 (N. D. Ga. 1941) ; Mile High Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Fraizer, I57 P. (2d) 125, 113 Colo. 338 (1945).
178. Mornford v. Andrews, 151 F. (2d) 51I (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) ; Bowers v. Rem-
ington Rand, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 621 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
179. Schammo v. Ahlskog, 158 Kan. 203, 146 P. (2d) 408 (944).
18o. Mornford v. Andrews, 151 F. (2d) 51i (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) ; Bloch v. Bell,
63 F. Supp. 863 (W. D. Ky. 1945), aff'd, 152 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946) ; Low-
rimoore v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 3o F. Supp. 647 (S. D. Ga. 1939), aff'd, 116 F. (2d)
27 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 559 (1941) ; Stewart v. Mabee Oil &
Gas Co., 158 Kan. 388, 147 P. (2d) 731 (1944) ; Clevenger v. Ritter Lumber Co., 294
Ky. 764, 172 S. W. (2d) 625 (1943). See Note (1943) 43 CoL. L. Rxv. 355, 356.
18i. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 66 Sup. Ct 1187 (1946).
182. Id. at X192.
183. Ibid.
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"The solution, however, is not to penalize the employee by deny-
ing him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the
precise extent of uncompensated work." 184
The Court then held in a situation where the employee could not
prove the precise amount of overtime worked,
that an employee has carried out his burden if he proves
that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly
compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the
amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reason-
able inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come
forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed
or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference
to be drawn from the employee's evidence. If the employer fails
to produce such evidence, the court may then award damages to
the employee, even though the result be only approximate." L85
The result would appear to be to remedy the injustices that arose
from the inability of employees to prove their cases. Prior to this
decision some courts had already worked out a rough and ready method
of estimating the amount to be recovered even in the absence of any
clear proof of hours of overtime worked.' 86  Recent cases make it clear
that the trier of the facts will now only be required to approximate a
fair recovery.
187
3. Exemptions
Since the employer's claim that the plaintiff is not covered by
the Act because of a specific exemption is an affirmative defense the
employer must carry the burden of proving such exemption.' 8 How-
ever, the employer sustains his burden by proving a prima facie case
184. Ibid.
I85. Ibid.
186. Strough v. Coll, Adm'x, 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,644 (E. D. Pa. 1943);
Steger v. Beard & Stone Electric Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 6o,643 (N. D. Tex.
194); Schanck v. Lehigh Valley Railroad, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 491 (City Ct. N. Y.
1944) ; Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., Referee's opinion, 174 Misc. 353, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (Sup. Ct. 194o), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 879, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 489 (4th
Dept. 1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 577, 38 N. E. (2d) 234 (1941) ; Smith v. Ogle, 196 Okla.
295, 164 P. (2d) 992 (I945) ; see Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 275, 282 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
187. Johnston v. Firemen's Insurance Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,120, 115 N.
Y. L. J. 1614 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave. Corp., io C. C. H. Lab.
Cas. 1162,9o7 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), aff'd, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 11 63,212 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946). Contra: Davies v. Onyx Oils & Resins, Inc.,'63 F. Supp. 777 (D. N. J. 1946).
188. Stanger v. Vocafilm Corp., 151 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) ; Distelhorst
v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 334 (S. D. Iowa, I944), dismissed per curiam,
i5o F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) ; Gibson v. Atlantic Co., 63 F. Supp. 492 (N. D.
Ga. 1945); Burke v. Le Crone-Benedict Ways, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 883 (E. D. Mich.
1945) ; Cohn v. Decca Distributing Corp., 5o F. Supp. 27o (E. D. Pa. 1943).
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and need not rebut exceptions from the exemptions.18 9  For example,
the Act exempts "any employee employed in a bona fide executive
. . . capacity . . . as defined and delimited by regulations of the
Administrator." 190 Under the regulations an employee, who might
otherwise be regarded as employed in an executive capacity ceases to be
such if more than twenty per cent of the hours worked by such em-
ployee is work of the same nature as that performed by nonexempt
employees.' 91  In one case 192 the employer proved that the employee
was in fact an "executive" as defined by the Administraior. It was
held to be the employee's burden to show, if he desired and could, that
he came within the twenty per cent exception.
B. Evidence
i. Oral
Unquestionably the plaintiff must produce evidence 193 of a cred-
ible nature 194 to support his allegations. His failure to do so is fatal.
Regarding this point it is difficult to generalize. Of course, there is a
statutory duty 11- upon the employer to keep records and infeasibility
is no excuse. 196  Such records, if complete, can be sufficient to prove
plaintiff's case. However, in the majority of those cases where the
action is for walking time, waiting time or other unrecorded work time
the employer's records are of no value.1 97  In most such cases the em-
ployee must prove the case by oral testimony of witnesses. Such tes-
timony has received varied treatment by the courts. The fact that
the hours were regular adds weight to the testimony. 98 The length
of time elapsing between the work performed and the trial is con-
sidered. 9
i89. Weeks v. Federal Cartridge Corp, io C. C. H. Lab.-Cas. 62,952 (D. Minn.
1946); Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,570 (D. N. 3.
i94).
190. 52 STAT. i067, 29 U. S. C. 2714, § 213 (1938).
19I. Regulations of Wage and Hour Division, § 541.1 (Oct. 12, 1940), 5 Fm. REG.
4077; 29 CODE FE. REG. pt. 541 (Supp. 1940).
192. Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 61,570 (D. N. J.
1943).
193. Simmons v. Straight Improvement Co., Inc, 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,394
(S. D. N. Y. 1944).
194. Griswold v. Rosenstock, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 11 62,807 (S. D. N. Y. i945).
195. 52 STAT. i066,29 U. S. C. 2713, § 211 (1938).
i96. Walling v. Panther Creek Mines, Inc., 148 F. (2d) 6o4 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945);
Walling .v. Reilly, 59 F. Supp. 740 (E. D. Pa. 1944).
197. See, e. g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 66 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1946)
(time clock records can be used as an appropriate measurement of hours worked only
when they accurately reflect periods worked); cf. Hickey v. Davidson Transfer &
Storage Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,163 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) (recovery allowed for
overtime hours as indicated by punched time cards).
i98. Murdick v. Cities Service Oil Co., 145 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. ioth, i944);
Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 184 Misc. 192, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 295 (Sup. Ct,
1945). '
i99. Toppin v. 12 East 22nd St. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 887 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
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Testimony in which ,the witnesses were forced to generalize and
refer to "average hours worked" has been accepted, where corrobo-
rated,200 and rejected where standing alone.201 This suggests that
corroboration is of importance. 202  However, if the plaintiff's oral evi-
dence is clear and unequivocal recovery usually follows. 20 3
2. Written
The cases frequently refer to the fact that the employee is under
no duty to keep written records.20 4  Nevertheless occasionally employees
keep some form of running account of hours worked. Usually such
records are rejected as not having been made in the normal course of
business, 20 5 the customary justification for the "account book excep-
tion" to the rule excluding hearsay. 06 Although some courts have ad-
mitted employees' records in evidence,20 7 it would seem better to use
the employee's written record as a method of refreshing his memory.
This has been permitted.
0 8
200. Smith v. Ogle, i96 Okla. 295, 164 P. (2d) 992 (1945).
201. Epps v. Weathers, 49 F. Supp. 2 (S. D. Ga. I943).
202. See Stewart v. Mabee Oil & Gas Co., i58 Kan. 388, 147 P. (2d) 731 (1944);
Vigiano v. Arena & Sons, Inc., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. f 62,o58, iii N. Y. L. J. 927 (Sup.
Ct 1944), where in absence of corroboration the plaintiffs were denied recovery. Espe-
dally is this true if defendant rebuts plaintiff's evidence. Randolph v. Calamus, 9 C. C.
H. Lab. Cas. 62,520 (S. D. Ga. i944), affd, isi F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 5th, I945).
2o3. DePasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 151 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945),
cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. IOO7 (1946) ; Edwards v. South Side Auto Parts Co., i8o
S. W. (2d) 1015 (Mo. App. 1944); Kessler v. Cliff Frocks, Inc., 184 Misc. 561, 56
N. Y. S. (2d) 164 (Sup. Ct 1945). See Parenti v. Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co.,
ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. ff 63,354 (Conn. 1946).
2o4. Ballard v. Consolidated Steel Corp., Ltd., 6I F. Supp. 996 (S. D. Cal. 1945).
See also DePasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., I5i F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945),
cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. ioo7 (1946) ; Smith v. Ogle, 196 Okla. 295, 164 P. (2d)
992 (1945) ; cf. Stein v. Gorden Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 F. Supp. 249 (W. D. Mo. 1942)
where, because plaintiff was an attorney, the court imposed the burden of keeping
records.
2o5. Jackson v. Pioneer Adhesive Works, Inc., 132 N. J. L. 397, 40 A. (2d) 634
(Sup. Ct. N. J. 1945). Accord: Suffron v. Street Bros. Construction Co., Inc., io
C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,871 (N. D. N. Y. 1945); Sherman v. Solomon, 9 C. C. H.
Lab. Cas. 1 62,571, "13 N. Y. L. J. 913 (N. Y. City Ct 1944). One employer's subse-
quent records have also been denied admission. Kessler v. Cliff Frocks, Inc., 184 Misc.
56r, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 164 (Sup. Ct. r945).
2o6. See McKELvEY, EviENzcE (5th ed. 1944) § 247. This rule would appear to
render admissible a building custodian's records and so the courts have held. Burke
v. LeGrone-Benedict Ways, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 883 (E. D. Mich. 1945); Pretto v.
South American Trading Corp., 115 N. Y. L. J. 1462 (N. Y. City Ct 1946).
207. Sapp v. Baird-Naundorf Lumber Co., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,999 (Wash.
Super. Ct. 1946); Colon v. Distilleries V. M. Ramirez & Cia., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
62,641 (D. Puerto Rico, 1945) ; Allen v. Moe, 39 F. Supp. 5 (D. Idaho, 1941) ; Wilson
Oil Co. v. Hardy, 49 N. Mex. 337, 164 P. (2d) 209 (i945). In Straughn v. Schlumber-
ger Well Surveying Corp., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,355 (S.D. Tex. 1946) the em-
ployee's records made for the employer were admitted in evidence despite employer's
contention that the records were not accurate.
2o8. Fanelli v. United States Gypsum Co., 141 F. (2d) 216 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944);
Lawley & Son Corp. v. South, 14o F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. ist, I944).
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3. Defensive Evidence
Recent cases have raised interesting questions concerning defen-
sive evidence. In a Nebraska case 209 the question arose whether an
employee's written release was admissible in evidence. The court sus-
tained the admissibility as an admission against interest. In view of
the circumstances, the court may have been correct since the defense
was that the employee was exempt and the release supported that de-
fense. However, any extension of the rule might weaken the present
rigid rule barring the effectiveness of releases-although not valid as
defenses they might be used to influence a jury.
A somewhat similar question concerns the admissibility in evi-
dence of the failure of the plaintiff to demand overtime payments prior
to termination of his employment. Two cases have held that evidence
of the failure to make such demand is admissible.21 0  This ruling ap-
pears to be clearly erroneous. The failure to make demand may be
caused by ignorance of the FLSA, belief that there is no coverage,
fear of losing one's job or a host of other factors. Assuming that it
proves that no overtime compensation is due, as one court did,211 seems
unwarranted.
IX. JUDGMENTS
A. Verdict
In view of the non-mathematical nature of the plaintiff's cause
of action a round-figure verdict doing substantial justice to plaintiff's
evidence will be upheld.212  However, if the verdict is simply a com-
promise it will be set aside 213 or if the verdict is contrary to the testi-
mony there may be a remittitur.21 4  A judgment notwithstanding the
compromise verdict may be granted where such judgments are author-
ized, as they are, for example, by the Federal Rules.215
2o9. Anderson v. Nebraska Defense Corp., 146 Neb. 466, 20 N. W. (2d) 322
(1945). The reverse aspect of this problem is found in Cunningham v. Davis, 203 Ark.
982, 159 S. W. (2d) 751 (x942), where the court permitted the employees to introduce
evidence showing an offer on the part of the employer to compromise by part payment.
21o. Schmidtke v. Conesa, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,982 (D. Puerto Rico 1946);
Foster v. Knopf Mfg. Co., io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,967 (D. Mass. 1946).
211. Schmidtke v. Conesa, io C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,982 (D. Puerto Rico 1946).
212. Ashenford v. L. Yukon & Sons Produce Co., 237 Mo. App. 1241, I72 S. W.
(2d) 881 (1943) ; Kessler v. Cliff Frocks, Inc., 184 Misc. 56I, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 164
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
213. Kirschenbaum v. National Tallow & Soap Co., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,585,
113 N. Y. L. J. 963 (Sup. Ct 1945).
214. Smith v. Ogle, 196 Okla. 295, 164 P. (2d) 992 (945). See also DeLuca v.
West 26th St. Corp., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 11 63,255 116 N. Y. L. J. 74 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1946).
215. Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 63 F. Supp. 120 (N. D. Iowa i945);
Riley v. Nutley Dye Works, 8 C. C. H. Lab Cas. 1 62,168 (D. N. J. 1943).
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B. Findings of Fact 
216
The findings of fact of the tribunal vested with the function of
making such findings are generally upheld unless clearly erroneous.
This rule has been applied to a special master, 217 to a referee in bank-
ruptcy,2 18 to trial courts, 2
19 and to the jury.220
C. Costs
Costs follow the action. The Act itself provides that "in addition
to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff" the court shall allow
"costs of the action." 221 This legislative injunction has been fol-
lowed.222  By the same token, when judgment is entered for the de-
fendant costs are assessed against the plaintiff.
223
D. Interest
Before the subject was finally decided by the Supreme Court, many
courts allowed interest from the date of the accrual of the action,2 24 or
from the date of suit.2 25  However, the Supreme Court has held that
the plaintiff may not recover interest because the liquidated damages
awarded by the statute are in lieu of interest.2 26 To hold to the con-
trary, the Court stated, would "produce the undesirable result of al-
lowing interest on interest." 227 Moreover, the Court also held that the
216. So long as any issue of relevant fact remains triable a motion for summary
judgment will be denied. Inter-Mountain Iron & Metal Co. v. Cortinez, 114 Colo. 89,
162 P. (2d) 237 (1945) ; Franz v. 48 West 48th St. Realization Corp., 60 N. Y. S.
(2d) i6o (N. Y. City Ct 1946).
217. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, Inc., 66 Sup. Ct 1187 (1946).
218. In re George R. Burrows, Inc., xo C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,713 (S. D. N. Y.
1945).
219. Dumas & Dumas v. King, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas.- 63,378 (C. C. A. 8th,
1946) ; Randolph v. Calamas, I51 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) ; Engebretsen v.
E. J. Albrecht Co., I5o F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945) ; Atlantic Co. v. Weaver, i5o
F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945).
220. Swoboda v. Carton Finishers, Inc., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,417 (N. D.
Ill. 1946) ; Belcher v. Hubbard, 21 So. (2d) 850 (Ala. App. 1945).
221. 52 STAT. I069 (1938), 29 U. S. C., §216 (b) (1940).
222. Cohn v. Decca Distributing Corp., 5o F. Supp. 270 (E. D. Pa. 1943) ; Koer-
ner v. Associated Linen Suppliers Laundry, Inc., i85 Misc. 123, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 92
(Sup. Ct. 1945), af'd, 62 N. Y. S. (2d) 774, 27o App. Div. 986 (Ist Dept. 1946).
223. Hinlder v. Eighty-Three Maiden Lane Corp., 5o F. Supp. 263 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).
224. Greenberg v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp, I44 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 2d, i944), rev'd
in part, 324 U. S. 697 (945) ; Kreeft v. Bates Piece Dye Works, 63 F. Supp. 881 (S.
D. N. Y. 1945); Steiner v. Pleasanttille Constructors, Inc., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
ff 62,397, 112 N. Y. L. J. ii8o (Sup. Ct I944)
225. Ackerman v. Baltimore Markets, Inc., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. ff 62,003 (E. D.
Pa. 1944).
226. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 (1945), rehearing denied,
325 U. S. 893 (945). Accord: Bell v. Bloch, 152 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
227. Id. at 712.
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right to interest in FLSA cases is a matter of federal, not local law,228
thus disposing of the matter for all jurisdictions. Of course, once
judgment is obtained the cause of action merges into the judgment 229
and interest runs on the judgment wherever the law so provides. The
Federal Judicial Code contains such a specific provision 230 and the
courts have applied it to FLSA judgments. 231
E. Attorneys' Fees
The Act provides that in addition to liquidated damages and
costs, the plaintiff shall be allowed by the court "a reasonable attor-
ney's fee to be paid by the defendant." 232 Since this provision is
of more than passing concern to the attorneys representing successful
plaintiffs it is not surprising that a great number of cases have in-
volved the question of what constitutes adequate remuneration to the
attorney.
A study of the cases involving fees indicates that the primary
factor influencing the size of the fee is the attitude of the court toward
the FLSA generally and the rule of law governing the case in particu-
lar.' For example, in one case, 233 the attorney had recovered, on be-
half of his clients, the sum of $3,058.50 and the court allowed the
munificent fee of $25o.oo. This is an extremely low fee compared to
fees allowed in recoveries of similar amounts.23 4  The clue to the rea-
son for the low fee is found in the court's sarcastic references to and
analysis of Kirschbaum v. Walling 235--the governing decision.
236
In fixing the fee, the court's attitude toward the plaintiff is a factor
that often equals, in importance, its attitude toward the law. Thus,
228. Ibid. The dogma on this subject is that state courts are bound by the Su-
preme Court interpretations on substantive matters relating to the FLSA but in prac-
tice and procedure the state rules govern. Ille v. Travis Oil Corp., 164 P. (2d) 998
(1945). It is a rule easier to state than apply. See GOODRICH, CoNFucr OF LAws (2d
ed. 1938) c. 5.
229. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 45 (a) and comment a.
230. 36 STAT. 1167 (I9II), 28 U. S. C., §811 (I94O).
231. Harris v. Crossett Lumber Co., 62 F. Supp. 856 (W. D. Ark. 1943), aff'd,
149 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945); Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 63 F.
Supp. 120 (N. D. Iowa, 1945). 1
232. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C., §216 (b) (1940).
233. Richardson v. Delaware Housing Association, 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. ff61,583
(S. D. Fla. 1943).
234. For example, see the following: Wilson v. Shuman, 140 F. (2d) 644 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1944) (recovery $3,957.66; fees allowed $494.71); Cahn v. Butler Building
Corp., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 62,466 (N. D. Ill. 1944) (recovery $3,662.37; fee allowed
$i,ooo) ; Cohn v. Decca Distributing Corp., 50 F. Supp. 270 (E. D. Pa. 1943) (recov-
ery $3,04.6o; fee allowed $500) ; Cassone v. William Edgar John & Associates, Inc.,
185 Misc. 573, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 169 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (recovery $2,8oo; fee allowed
$I,5OO).
235. 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
236. Richardson v. Delaware Hcusing Ass'n, Inc., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. at 1 64,657:
"Confused, but bound by the impelling precedent, I follow the holding in Walling v.
Kirschbaum, supra. Ita lex scril'ta:"
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in a Tennessee case 237 the plaintiff, a night watchman, sued and re-
covered $805.8o and the trial court awarded a fee of $3oo.oo-a rea-
sonable fee in view of the amount recovered. 238  However, the court
of appeals, although affirming the recovery, found that the plaintiff
had attempted to pad his overtime, and that he had a couch upon
which to sleep, "and undoubtedly did sleep away many hours he was
paid overtime." 239 Consequently the court reduced the attorney's fee
from $300.00 to $i.oo and graciously gave the attorney a "lien upon
the recovery for his services in the lower court and in this court." 240
The degree of defendant's fault has been regarded as relevant by
some courts who have considered, in fixing fees, such matters as the
absence of a wilful violation by the defendant 241 and the defendant's
good faith.
242
It is submitted that all these considerations are immaterial and
that the fee awarded should be calculated as though the controversy
were an action by the attorney against his client on a quantum meruit
count. A contrary rule will defeat the basic purpose of the Act and
some courts have expressly so stated. 243  Other courts, without dis-
cussing this aspect of the problem, have apparently reached the same
conclusion since they consider faetor that would normally be consid-
ered in a quasi-contract action. These factors include the attorney's
reputation and standing,24 4 the time and energy devoted to the case,245
the manner of presentation,246 the bar association's minimum fee sched-
ule, 2 47 and the amount recovered.
2 48
237. Robinson & Co. v. Larue, 25 Tenn. App. 284, 156 S. W. (2d) 359 (1941),
aff'd, 178 Tenn. 197, 156 S. W. (2d) 432 (1941).
238. For example, see the following: Porter, Adm'x v. Georgia Power & Light
Co,. 50 F. Supp. 959 (M. D. Ga. 1943) (recovery $691.54; fee $4oo) ; Johnston v. Fire-
men's Insurance Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,120, 115 N. Y. L. J. 1614 (Sup. Ct.
1946) (recovery $872.8o; fee $375) ; cf Gosinski v. Eclipse Glass Co., Inc., 13 Conn.
Sup. 285 (Conn. C. P. Ct. 1945) (recovery $741.34; fee $I5o).
239. Robinson & Co. v. Larue, 25 Tenn. App. 284, 156 S. W. (2d) 359, 362 (1941).
24o. Ibid.
241. South v. Lawley & Son, Inc., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Gas. 61,682 (D. Mass. 1943),
i4o F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. ist, 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 746 (1944).
242. Fiedler v. Potter, i8o Tenn. 176, 172 S. W. (2d) 1007 (1943).
243. Greenberg v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp., 144 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 324 U. S. 697 (1945) ; Hutchinson v. Barry, 5o F. Supp. 292 (D.
Mass. 1943).
244. Cassone v. William Edgar John & Associates, Inc., 185 Misc. 573, 57 N. Y.
S. (2d) I69 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
245. Dumas & Dumas v. King, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,378 (C. C. A. 8th,
1946) ; Ferguson v. Prophet Co., Ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,297 (S. D. Ind. 1946) ;
Corey v. Detroit Steel Corp., 52 F. Supp. 138 (E. D. Mich. 1943) ; Phelan v. Carstens,
Linnekin & Wilson, 187 Misc. 352, 62 N. Y. S. (2d) 214 (N. 'Y. Mun. Ct 1946) ; cf.
Poe v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,656 (D. Ariz. 1944).
246. E. H. Clarke Lumber Co. v. Kurth, 152 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945);
Redfern v. Jax Beer Co., 4 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1160,402 (N. D. Tex. 1941), rev'd on
other grounds, 124 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
247. Corey v. Detroit Steel Corp., 52 F. Supp. 138 (E. D. Mich. 1943).
248. Shetter v. Somerville Iron Works, 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1162,166 (E. D.
Tenn. 1944).
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The last factor listed is, of course, of great importance. 249 A statis-
tical survey of all cases found by the writers demonstrates that the
average fee in FLSA cases is approximately 20%'.250 This is espe-
cially accurate in cases involving recoveries of large sums.2 5 - However,
if the work of the attorney merits it, especially in cases involving re-
coveries of smaller sums, the fee may even exceed the amount recov-
ered.
25 2
Certain words of caution may be of assistance to counsel repre-
senting claimants in FLSA suits:
i. Only one fee is permitted although there may be a large num-
ber of plaintiffs. 253  However, the fact that the, attorney found it
necessary to employ an assistant attorney may be considered in fixing
the fee.
254
2. In selecting a forum the counsel fee should be considered as
part of the plaintiff's claim for recovery so as to eliminate courts of
limited monetary jurisdiction. For example, where an action was
brought in a court whose jurisdiction was limited to $3,ooo.00 and
$3,ooo.oo was recovered the court felt that it could not add a counsel
fee. 25 5  For similar reasons an FLSA claim in bankruptcy should in-
clude an allowance of counsel fees as part of the wage claim. If a
separate application is made for the fee, it will be denied.
25 6
3. The court may permit the jury to fix the fee,257 but most fre-
quently the court fixes the fee itself. The argument that this deprives
the defendant of his right to trial by jury has been rejected in ac-
249. See, e. g., Roberg v. Phipps Estate, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,263 (C. C. A.
2d, 1946), where the circuit court of appeals, in addition to awarding a counsel fee for
arguing the appeal stated that since the appellate decision had increased the amount re-
covered the trial court might review its award of a counsel fee to increase it.
25o. The arithmetic average is 18.3%; the weighted average is 19.79.
251. Poe v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 9 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,656 (D. Ariz. 1944)
(recovery $57,071.30; fee $IO,OOO) ; Steiner v. Pltasantville Constructors, Inc., 9 C. C.
H. Lab. Cas. 7162,397, 112 N. Y. L. J. 1i8o (Sup. Ct. 1944) (recovery $15,745.50; fee
$3,000) ; Williams v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 8 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 62,033 (C.
C. Milwaukee Co., Wis., 1943) (recovery $48,ooo; .fee $9,6oo).
252. Burke v. Le Crone-Benedict Ways, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 883 (E. D. Mich. 1945)
(recovery $210.76; fee $i5o) ; Morgan v. Atlantic Coast Line IL Co., 32 F. Supp. 617
(S. D. Ga. 1940) (recovery $i56.8o; fee $25o) ; Wilson Oil Co. v. Hardy, 49 N. Mex.
337, 164 P. (2d) 209 (i945).
253. Distelhorst v. Day & Zimmerman, 58 F. Supp. 334 (S. D. Iowa, 1944), appeal
dismissed per curiam, i5o F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) ; cf. DeLuca v. West 26th
St. Corp., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 63,322, ii6 N. Y. L. J. ii5 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
254. Timberlake v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1 61,623 (S. D.
Iowa, 1943).
255. Caperna v. Williams-Bauer Corp., i85 Misc. 687, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 254 (N.
Y. City Ct. 1945), aff'd no opinion, 186 Misc. 27, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 876 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Thus, in Schneider & Son, Inc. v. Justice, 293 Ky. 126, i68-S. W. (2d) 591 (Ky. App.
1943) it was held that attorney's fees may be included for the purpose of determining
the jurisdiction of a court with a lower limit to monetary jurisdiction.
256. In re L. E. Elliott Brokerage Co., 48 F. Supp. 44 (D. Kan. 1942).
257. Acme Lumber Co. v. Shaw, 243 Ala. 42I, io S. (2d) 285 (1942) ; Ashenfordv.
L. Yukon & Sons Produce Co., 237 Mo. App. 1241, 172 S. W. (2d) 88I (1943).
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cordance with the usual rule that the inviolability of jury trial is con-
fined to common law causes of action.
25 8
4. The attorney should be careful to see that evidence relating
to the question of the fee is before the court.25 9  This has been
done by direct testimony of the attorney,2 60 the submission of briefs,
261
and special hearings set for the sole purpose of considering the fee. 262
5. For successfully defending the decision of the lower court, the
attorney is entitled to a separate and distinct fee.263 The better pro-
cedure seems to be to apply directly to the appellate court for the fee
for defending a judgment on appeal. 264  However, where a federal dis-
trict court refused to grant a fee for appellate work, the circuit court
of appeals reversed and remanded, stating that the responsibility for
fixing fees properly is that of the trial court where the work begins
and ends and where the value of the services rendered can best be esti-
mated.2es Fees for arguing appeals are never large. An examina-
tion of numerous cases reveals that the average allowance has been
approximately $325.oo, the largest fee allowed being $7oo.oo 268 and
the smallest $5o.oo.
2 6 7
6. On the question of fees the trial court's decision is subject to
review but the likelihood of obtaining a reversal, except in cases of
egregious error, is remote in view of the rule that the trial court
may exercise its discretion in fixing the fee.2 68  However, where the
258. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Bazanos, 245 Ala. 73, 15 S. (2d) 720 (1943); Ed-
wards v. South Side Auto Parts Co., i8o S. W. (2d) 1015 (Mo. App. 1944).
259. Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone Co., 5i F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1943);
Ashenford v. L. Yukon & Sons Produce Co., 237 Mo. App. 1241, 172 S. W. (2d) 881
(1943) ; cf. Agnew v. Johnson, 352 Mo. 222, 176 S. W. (2d) 489 (1943).
26o. Ashenford v. L. Yukon & Sons Produce Co., 237 Mo. App. i241, 172 S. W.
(2d) 88I (1943). See also Ferguson v. Prophet Co., ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1763,297
(S. D. Ind. 1946).
261. Deutsch v. Heywood-Wakefield Co., 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 161,596 (S. D. N.
Y. 1943).
262. Bell v. Porter, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 163,147 (N. D. Ill. 1946) ; Smith v.
Ogle, 164 P. (2d) 992 (Okla. 1945).
263. DePasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 15i F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945),
cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. ioo7 (1946) ; Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F. (2d)
543 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945, aff'd, 327 U. S. 757 (1946) ; Ispass v. Pyramid Motor Freight
Corp., 152 F. (2d) 619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
264. See, e. g., Dumas & Dumas v. King, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. ff 63,378 (C. C. A.
8th, 1946) ; Maddrix v. Dize, 6i F. Supp. 946 (D. Md. 1945), rev'd, i53 F. (2d) 274
(C. C. A. 4th, 1946); E. H. Clarke Lumber Co. v. Kurth, 152 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A.
9th, 1945) ; cf. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Keen, ii C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 1163,353
(C. C. A. 8th, 1946).
265. Maddrix v. Dize, 153 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
266. Maddrix v. Dize, 155 F. (2d) ioig (C. C. A. 4th, 1946).
267. Anderson v. N. Y. Say. Bank, 182 Misc. 945, 51 N. Y. S. 425 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
268. For cases in which plaintiff appealed unsuccessfully see Schroeder Co., Inc.
v. Clifton, 153 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. ioth, 1946), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 1351
(1946) ; Sullivan & Cromwell v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 96 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A.
ioth, 1938); Robinson & Co. v. Lame, 178 Tenn. 197, 156 S. W. (2d) 432 (i94I).
For an unsuccessful appeal by defendant see Fiedler v. Potter, 7 C. C. H. Lab. Cas.
6J,747 (Tenn. 1943).
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trial court errs and an appellate court can be convinced that there was
error a fee can be increased 269 or lowered 270 on appeal.
7. It has been held that although the employees settle the case
out of court the attorney is still entitled to his statutory fee. 27 1  The
court states: ". . . clients cannot settle the lawyer out of his rea-
sonable attorney fees." 272
8. Although it has become general practice for attorneys to insure
themselves against low court-awarded fees by separate fee contracts"
with the plaintiffs, judicial treatment of such contracts has rarely arisen.
One court, in considering this question, stated that the practice is con-
trary to the policy of the Act since it imposes a burden that the law
sought to remove.273 However, the same court admitted that the prac-
tice is not prohibited by the Act.
2 74
Two courts have indicated in dicta that if there is a fee agree-
ment the court should not award an attorney's fee exceeding the amount
agreed upon by the plaintiff and his attorney. 275 However, it has been
held that if the court intends to award an attorney's fee lower than that
specified in the fee agreement the figure in the fee agreement should
not be considered. 6
269. Maddrix v. Dize, 155 F. (2d) IOI9 (C. C. A. 4th, 1946); Greenberg v. Arse-
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